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Introduction 
 
A widespread idea in the literature on distributive fairness is that we should give 
extra weight, priority, to benefitting the worse off. Luck egalitarians argue that 
compensation for shortfalls that are due to bad luck, i.e. due to no fault or choices 
of the agent, contribute to the overall goodness of an outcome (cf. Arneson 1989; 
Cohen 1989; Temkin 1993, 2003). Sufficientarian approaches of different types 
suggest that we have special obligations to bring individuals up to a certain 
threshold level and thus ought to give extra weight to benefits to individuals that 
fall short of this level (cf. Anderson 2000; Crisp 2003; Frankfurt 1987; Shields 
2012; Wiggins 1987). Prioritarian theories claim that the worse off an individual 
is in absolute terms, the more a benefit given to her is worth (cf. Broome 1991, 
2015; Parfit 1997, 2012). According to proponents of the capability approach, 
finally, it is generally accepted that individuals that lack certain capabilities 
should be given priority (cf. Alkire 2005, Alkire et al. 2015, Nussbuam 2000, Sen 
1992). In this paper, we argue that due to restrictions on what individuals can 
feasibly attain, e.g. incurable diseases that constrain attainable health states, 
learning disabilities that restrict an individual’s educational attainment, wars 
that limit the effectiveness of anti-poverty programmes within a particular 
period of time etc., there are at least three different ways to understand the 
general notion that benefits to individuals that are characterized by some form 
of shortfall should be given extra weight, that all three interpretations are 
plausible, but that they are inconsistent. 
 
Numerous theories of distributive fairness can be re-conceptualized in terms of 
proposals to close gaps. Egalitarianism can be understood as the view that 
promotes closing the inequality gap, i.e. the shortfall from perfect equality. 
Sufficientarian theories can be conceived of as the views that promote closing 
the insufficiency gap, i.e. the shortfall from the state of affairs where all 
individuals are at or above the sufficiency level. Prioritarianism can, at least for 
practical purposes, be seen as the view that promotes closing the priority gap, i.e. 
the shortfall from the state of affairs where individual benefits are worth the 
same, regardless of who enjoys them. The capabilities approach can be 
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understood as the view that promotes that we should close the capabilities gap, 
i.e. the shortfall from fair distribution of capabilities. For each of these normative 
theories, the relevant gap can be mitigated by bringing all individuals in the 
population to the level at which she no longer contributes to the aggregate gap 
size, and the closer to this level individuals are, the better.  
 
In this paper we address two aggregation problems that arise for any theory that 
promotes gap closures under conditions of scarcity. These problems arise once a 
well-defined ideal target for each individual in the population has been identified 
and the amount of available resources doesn’t suffice to bring every individual to 
the ideal target. The first problem is well known and arises in relation to the two-
dimensionality of gaps. Gaps relevant to distributive fairness are defined in 
terms of a multitude of individual shortfalls of different magnitude. Several 
individuals have shortfalls, and the shortfalls can be of different size. Theories 
that promote gap closures must provide an answer to how these dimensions 
relate to each other (cf. Shields 2012; Temkin 1993).  
 
The second problem is generally overlooked and arises in relation to popular 
justifications of aggregations of the two dimensions that invoke the magnitude of 
shortfalls as justification of the aggregation and provide extra weight to larger 
shortfalls. We show that, even under the assumptions that we (i) have 
established a unique unit of measurement (e.g. resources, utility, capabilities) 
that enables scalar comparisons of the magnitude of different shortfalls, and (ii) 
have established a well-defined ideal target (e.g. X amount of resources, utility-
level Y, capability set Z), justifications of a specific aggregation that rely on a 
notion of how bad off someone is are indeterminate. This indeterminacy is due to 
the fact that in many instances there are three distinct ways to establish how 
badly off someone is even when a unique unit of measurement and a definitive 
ideal target level have been established. This entails that theories that promote 
this type of solution to the first aggregation problem will be inconsistent in some 
applications. 
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Our argument relies on the identification of three distinct relevant status levels 
for each individual in terms of what matters (cf. Herlitz & Horan 2016a). An 
individual has a current status, i.e. her position with respect to what matters in 
the current state of affairs. There is for each individual an ideal level, i.e. the 
status that the individual ideally should be at. And there is for each individual an 
attainable level, i.e. the higher status that the individual ideally should be at and 
also feasibly can be at. Once these three status levels have been outlined, we 
show that there are at least three ways in which to understand how well an 
individual fares both in absolute and relative terms. 
 
In order to present the argument we will use a generalization of a specific 
indicator of gap closures which is inspired by the so-called FGT-class indicators 
popular in poverty research (Alkire et al. 2015; Foster, Greer & Thorbecke 1985, 
2010; Herlitz & Horan 2016, MS). This indicator has been designed to measure 
the extent to which heterogeneous individual shortfalls (defined as a technical 
concept that denotes the difference between a current status and a desired level) 
of a population are satisfied. We here extend this indicator to situations where 
attainability-constraints apply. The indicator provides us with a numerical 
representation of gap closures, which facilitates discussing gap closures and 
reveals the particular aggregation problem we are interested in.   
 
Our argument is straightforward if at occasions somewhat technical. In section 
one we stress the importance of making a distinction between what we refer to 
as the ideal level and the attainable level. In combination with a current level, this 
distinction reveals that there are three distinct types of shortfalls: current level-
ideal level, current level-attainable level, and attainable level-ideal level. In 
section two we show that once we have made this distinction there are three 
different ways to develop prioritization models, weighting schemes, in light of 
them. In section three we illustrate that the prioritization models that are 
compatible with the notion of compensating for shortfalls and closing gaps 
conflict. In section four we discuss some possible extensions of the paper.  
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I: Pure Allocation Problems:  
The Distinction between Attainable and Ideal Target Levels 
 
We are in this paper interested in choice situations in which some good (broadly 
conceived) is to be distributed across a heterogonous population, and normative 
criteria that apply to such situations. Choice situations that concern the 
distribution of goods can be partially characterized by involving a population 
with individuals at different current levels in terms of the good. By current level 
we here mean the amount of the good that an individual possesses at the 
moment of the choice, i.e. the amount of the good that the individual enjoys if 
there is no intervention. Thus, for example, when health improvements are 
distributed among a population every individual has a specific current level in 
terms of the good which is distributed, i.e. health. When monetary resources are 
distributed in a population, every individual has a specific current level in terms 
of the good which is distributed, i.e. money. When utility is distributed, every 
individual has a specific current level in terms of utility. And so on. 
 
A familiar quarrel concerning theories that address and promote certain 
prioritization schemes when goods are distributed across a heterogonous 
population relates to the issue of which good, and in extension which unit of 
measurement, matters (cf. Cohen 1993; Dworkin 1981a, 1981b; Pogge 2002; Sen 
1980). Some contend that what matters are resources (cf. Pogge 2002; Rawls 
1971). Some hold that what matters is welfare (cf. Hare 1981, Kymlicka 1990). 
Some hold that what matters are so-called capabilities (Nussbaum 2000; Sen 
1992). And some hold that it is opportunities for wellbeing that matter (Arneson 
1989; Cohen 1989; Roemer 1998). Our argument assumes that a single well-
defined good has been established, but the argument is compatible with a wide 
range of views about what this good is (e.g. resources, welfare, capabilities) and 
therefore also relevant to theories of distributive fairness regardless of what 
good they promote as relevant.  
 
A common, if not always explicated, way of thinking about distributive fairness 
and about compensating for shortfalls is to compare current levels with some 
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uniform target level and promote a gap closure so that individuals are brought 
toward the uniform target level. This is perhaps best exemplified in the more 
practical realm by recent research on poverty reduction (cf. Alkire et al. 2015; 
Foster, Greer & Thorbecke 1985, 2010), but also some theoretical approaches 
(e.g. sufficientarianism, the capabilities approach) make this feature very clear 
(cf. Nussbaum 2000; Shields 2012). Uniform target levels can be thought of in at 
least three different ways. Firstly, one can think of the uniform target level as a 
mean value of the current levels of all individuals in the population. Secondly, 
one can conceptualize the uniform target level in terms of a perfectionist ideal. 
Perfectionist ideals can be framed in terms of how well off the individual who is 
best off is (cf. Temkin 1993), in terms of some minimum level of what is needed 
for a decent life (cf. Alkire 2005a, Anderson 2000; Crisp 2003; Wiggins 1987), or 
in terms of an unattainably high level, which in practice amounts to a prioritarian 
position (cf. Parfit 1997, 2012; Broome 2015). Finally, one can infer a uniform 
target level based on every individual’s relation to every other individual 
(Temkin 1993). Regardless of how one conceptualizes a target level, a 
straightforward way to compensate for shortfalls is to give additional priority to 
allocation alternatives that reduce the size of the aggregated gaps between 
current levels and the uniform target level.  
 
A limitation of this general way of thinking about distributive principles is that it 
presupposes uniformity of the target levels. It is important to recognize that 
uniform target levels are in many situations unrealistic. All individuals cannot 
attain the same things. In many situations there will, therefore, for every 
individual in the population be two target levels: on the one hand an attainable 
level, and on the other hand an ideal level. The latter level will plausibly be 
uniform across a population. The former will plausibly not be uniform across a 
population. Consider, for example, distribution of health. When health resources 
are allocated across a population every individual will be on a certain, 
individuated current level in terms of health. For all individuals in the population 
there will also be a uniform ideal level, i.e. perfect health. The distance between 
these, we commonly think, denotes how severe the health condition of an 
individual is. However, every individual in the population will have individual, 
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non-uniform attainable levels. A diabetic will be unable to reach the ideal level 
since there is no cure for diabetes. She can receive the best care there is for 
diabetics, but that will place her on her individual attainable level, not on the 
uniform ideal level. Similarly, of course, for individuals with celiac, the blind, the 
asthmatics, those with incurable cancer, Down syndrome and so on. Likewise, it 
is not obviously true that all individuals can feasibly reach an ideal level in the 
area of education. And, it could even be impossible for every individual to attain 
the same level of income, and it appears plausible that not every individual can 
attain the same level of welfare. 
 
It is difficult to establish precise definitions of attainability constraints, but their 
relevance ought to be obvious enough. In order to proceed with our argument 
we suggest, following David Wiggins that the attainability constraints should be 
understood as a set of time constraints, technology constraints, and ability 
constraints (cf. Alkire 2005b; Wiggins 1987). Some gap closures are impossible 
due to time constraints. We might not have time to provide adequate amount of 
aid to individuals who due to no fault or choice of their own suffer the 
consequences of a natural disaster for example. Some shortfalls cannot be fully 
remedied because we lack the appropriate technology. We lack the technology to 
cure diabetes, but also to cure certain mental illnesses that significantly reduces 
wellbeing. Finally, some individuals lack the ability to reach the ideal level due to 
intrinsic qualities. Individuals are pathologically different: some are prone to 
depression, some have allergies, and so on. It is important to note that 
attainability constraints, being designed in this way, are not universal, and the 
three different classes of constraints are also somewhat intertwined. What 
appears to be a time constraint and what appears to be an ability constraint 
might turn out to be a technology constraint for example. Yet, this is hard to 
avoid since it is impossible to foresee what potential technology there is. The 
attainability constraints differ depending on where a policy is implemented as 
well as on when it is implemented.  
 
More abstractly, we thus suggest that a general mistake that is often made when 
we think about gap closures and compensations for relevant shortfalls, and when 
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we have embraced a unique unit of measurement, is that individual shortfalls are 
conceived of in terms of the distance between merely two well-defined points: a 
current level and a target level. With such a conception of what shortfalls are 
answers to the question of how unequal a society is can be generated by either 
looking at the current level of the worst off (Rawlsian maximin), by adding up 
the sum total of shortfalls, or by applying weighted addition of the shortfalls 
(Temkin, 1993). This, we contend, is an overly simplistic analysis. Instead, we 
suggest that one should think of the relevant shortfalls of an individual as 
defined by three points: a current status level, an ideal level, and an attainable 
level. What matters is how well someone is doing in terms of X, how well they 
ideally would be doing in terms of X, and their actual attainable level: how well 
they feasibly can be doing in terms of X. This suggestion has support in the 
literature on needs, recent work of capabilities approach theorists, development 
literature and also research on environmental challenges (cf. Alkire 2005, Alkire 
et al. 2015; Doyal & Gough 1991; Gough 2015; Wiggins 1987). Yet, to our 
knowledge, no one has yet incorporated the idea into a single framework that 
also accounts for other ways of thinking about shortfalls, and no one has to our 
knowledge pointed to the theoretical challenges that the conflicts that can be 
identified pose. 
 
Three general types of shortfalls can ground both what we should remedy and 
priority weights that apply to individual benefits. First, there is the shortfall that 
is defined in terms of the difference between an individual’s current level and an 
ideal level. We will call this bad offness. This is, it appears, what most theories of 
distributive fairness address. Second, there is the shortfall that is defined in 
terms of the difference between an individual’s current level and her attainable 
level. We will call this bad realization. This shortfall is rarely discussed in the 
normative-theoretical literature even though it appears to be the most 
practically useful concept (cf. Alkire 2005). It is clearly a highly relevant type of 
shortfall when we attempt to remedy shortfalls. Indeed, it appears to increase 
the risk of resource waste to not use this concept of shortfall in such situations. 
Yet, it might also be relevant when we assign weights to individual benefits (cf. 
Herlitz & Horan MS).  
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Finally, there are the shortfalls that are defined in terms of the difference 
between attainable levels and ideal levels. We will call this bad outlooks. A 
seemingly reasonable, yet overlooked, idea that seems highly relevant to 
distributive fairness is that this is a valid ground for priority weights. A 
straightforward example of when this seems plausible is this: imagine two 
individuals, Matt and Lisa. Their current levels are identical. Let’s say they each 
have 1 unit of what matters. The ideal levels for both are also identical. Let’s say 
100 units of what matters. They only differ in that the attainable level for Matt is 
90 units, while it for Lisa is 10 units. Now, imagine that we face a choice situation 
in which there are only two alternatives: either we allocate 1 unit to Matt, or we 
allocate 1 unit to Lisa. It here seems plausible that we should allocate the unit to 
Lisa and compensate for the fact that she is worse off than Matt based on the fact 
that her outlooks are worse. 
 
Some attention has recently been given to the potential relevance of individuals’ 
prospects in discussions concerning distributive principles and in particular 
prioritiarianism (cf. Broome 2015; Parfit 2012; Voorhoeve & Fleurbaey 2012). It 
is worth underlining that whereas attainability constraints are related to 
prospects, prospects such as they have been discussed in the literature is a factor 
that is different from attainable levels. Prospects, such as they have been 
addressed in the literature, concern (at least partly) what an individual will 
achieve without an intervention. The idea of attainable levels is more specific. 
They concern the limitations on what an intervention can do. That being said, 
our argument can, we believe, be transferred to discussions about prospects 
more generally. 
 
In light of the above discussion, we suggest that when conceptualizing choice 
situations in which distributive fairness is at stake, one needs to distinguish 
three different levels that might be relevant to the choice. First, there is the 
current level for each individual in the population. These often differ across a 
population. Second, there is the attainable level for each individual in the 
population. Also these at the very least occasionally differ. Not every individual 
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can feasibly attain the same level in terms of that which matters to the choice, 
e.g. health, education, income, goods. Third, there is an ideal level for each 
individual in the population. This is often uniform for the population. Yet, also 
this level might be heterogonous, for example if one allows for dessert to be 
relevant for the choice. 
 
II: Three Aggregate Gap Closure Indicators that Prioritize the “Worse Off” 
 
In this section, we present a model and indicator to measure the extent of 
aggregate gap closure in a population of individuals with different current levels 
and heterogeneous closable gaps. We first introduce the three types of individual 
levels and derive our three notions of individual shortfall from differences 
between pairs of these levels. We then use the indicator to characterize 
resources according to their availability and develop weighting schemes based 
on different types of shortfall for situations where resources are scarce. 
 
Suppose  = {1,2, … , } is a population of  individuals in which each individual 

 ∈  is characterized by three types of levels in line with the discussion in the 
previous section. Levels are assumed to be well-defined and measurable for all 
individuals with a common unit of measurement, e.g. utility, health, functionings. 
First, there is the ideal target level of an individual, where  ∗∗ > 0 measures the 
ideal level of individual i, e.g. the poverty line, good health, sufficiency threshold, 
population mean. Second, there is the attainable level of an individual:  ≥ 0 
measures this attainable level of 
, e.g. the attainable health level. Finally, there is 
the current level of the individual:  ≥ 0 denote the current level of individual 
, 
e.g. the poverty of an individual, the (poor) health status,  the insufficiency.    
 
We consider the following type of intervention. Given an initial situation 
 = , , ∗∗)) , suppose  ≥ 0 is an amount of resources to be distributed 
across the population and   denotes the quantity of the good allocated to 
individual 
. There are two types of feasibility constraints which restrict the 
effectiveness of this intervention. First, there is a resource constraint.  An 
allocation  = )  is said to be achievable for resources R if the aggregate 
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amount of the good allocated does not exceed the total amount of the good 
available, i.e. provided the following resource constraint holds ∑  ≤ .1 
Second, there is the attainability constraint discussed in the previous sections, 
namely that the achieved level or post-intervention status of an individual 
cannot exceed her attainable level, i.e. an individual’s achieved level is given by 
 +  provided this quantity does not exceed her attainable level, i.e. provided 
 +  ≤ . On the other hand, if this quantity exceeds her attainable level, i.e. 
 +  > , then her achieved level is equal to her attainable level and we can 
say that an excess amount of resources has been allocated to individual 
 in light 
of her attainability constraint.  
  
Two important features of attainable levels deserve to be mentioned at this 
point. Firstly, the ideal levels may not be attainable for all members of the 
population. In particular, if  < ∗∗ for some 
 ∈ , then person 
’s ideal level is 
unattainable regardless of the quantity of resources allocated to person 
. 
Secondly, it is possible that for at least some members of the population, their 
attainable level exceeds their ideal target level even if their current level does 
not, i.e.   < ∗∗ <   for some 
 ∈ . For example such cases can arise frequently 
in poverty analysis and according to sufficientarian approaches to distributive 
fairness, where the attainable incomes of some of the poor may exceed, perhaps 
greatly, the poverty line/sufficiency threshold. In view of the objective of 
aggregate gap closure, e.g. poverty eradication or securing a basic minimum of 
welfare for each individual (cf. Dorsey 2012), what matters for these individuals 
is whether a resource allocation helps the individual achieve her ideal target 
level or not, e.g. the poverty line or the basic minimum, and not whether she 
exceeds her ideal level since achieved levels beyond this ideal level add no extra 
value to the objective. With this in mind, the simplest way of dealing with the 
second feature of attainable levels in light of the capped objective is to define a 
capped attainable level, denoted ∗, such that ∗ = , if  < ∗∗ and ∗ = ∗∗, if 
 ≥ ∗∗. For ease of exposition, we shall hereafter refer to the capped attainable 
                                                        
1 If an individual gains resources then  > 0. Whereas if she loses resources  < 0. Otherwise 
 = 0. 
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level simply as the attainable level, although this capped restriction will be 
implicitly present throughout the analysis.  
 
In this paper, we focus on situations in which shortfalls arise because current 
levels do not exceed attainable and ideal levels, ideal levels are capped and may 
not be attainable for all members of the population, i.e.  
 
 ≤ ∗ ≤ ∗∗ < ∞, for all 
 ∈  
 
Each individual is thus characterized by a triple , ∗, ∗∗) and our three notions 
of individual shortfall are defined in terms of differences or gaps in the pairs of 
each of these levels. Firstly, an individual’s realization shortfall is measured by 
the difference between the individual’s current level and her attainable level, i.e. 
 − ∗ ≤ 0. Negative values indicate the presence of a gap, and its magnitude 
measures the extent of the individual’s realization shortfall (cf. Herlitz & Horan 
MS). In particular, individuals with larger realization shortfalls are considered 
worse off from a bad realization perspective. Importantly, this type of gap is a 
closable gap, i.e. if sufficient resources exist, realization shortfalls can be satisfied 
for all members of the population. 
 
Secondly, an individual’s bad-offness shortfall is measured by the difference 
between her current level and her ideal target level, i.e.  − ∗∗ ≤ 0. This 
difference measures an individual’s idealized gap, i.e. the individual’s current 
distance to the ideal. Idealized gaps are not necessarily closable. They are 
closable only in the case where an individual’s attainable level is equal to her 
ideal level, i.e. ∗ = ∗∗, otherwise they are not. Individuals with larger bad-
offness shortfalls are considered worse-off from this perspective.   
 
Finally, an individual’s bad-outlooks shortfall is measured by the difference 
between her feasibility-constrained target level and her ideal level, i.e. 
∗ − ∗∗ ≤ 0. This type of shortfall is non-closable, i.e. regardless of the quantity 
of available resources, bad-outlooks shortfalls cannot be satisfied, due to, for 
example, time or technological constraints. Bad-outlooks shortfalls thus limit an 
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individual’s prospects with respect to the ideal target, irrespective of resource 
availability. Individuals with larger bad-outlooks shortfalls are considered 
worse-off from a bad-outlooks perspective. 
 
The following are two relevant special cases of our model, examples of which we 
will consider in the following section. First, there is the situation discussed in the 
Lisa and Matt example of the previous section. In this class of situations, all 
members of the population have individuated attainable levels, the same ideal 
level  > 0, and a common current level  > 0, i.e. ∗∗ =  for all 
 and  =  for 
all 
. Thus,  = , ∗, ))  refers to a situation characterized by a uniform ideal 
target, a common starting point and heterogeneous attainable levels. Individuals 
with relatively higher attainable levels, i.e. better prospects, experience larger 
realization shortfalls, but smaller bad-outlooks shortfalls. All individuals have 
the same level of bad-offness shortfall.  
 
Second, there are situations characterized by a common ideal level  > 0, i.e. 
∗∗ =   for all 
 , and individuated current and attainable levels. Thus 
 = , ∗, ))  refers to a situation characterized by a uniform ideal target, 
and heterogeneous current and attainable levels.  Individuals with relatively 
lower current levels, i.e. lower starting points, experience higher bad-offness 
shortfalls, and individuals with relatively higher attainable levels, i.e. better 
prospects, have lower bad-outlooks shortfalls  
 
Following Herlitz and Horan, the indicator we present measures aggregate gap 
closures as a weighted sum of the individual closable gaps of the population (cf. 
Herlitz & Horan MS).  In our model, the relevant closable gap is the individual’s 
realization shortfall, i.e.  − ∗.2 Suppose # ≥ 0 is the weight given to individual 
i’s realization shortfall, where the sum of the weights is standardized to equal 1, 
i.e. ∑ # = 1. Given an initial situation	 = , ∗, ∗∗)) , resources  ≥ 0, 
allocation  = )  and weighting scheme # = #) , the value of the 
indicator of aggregate gap closures, denoted %, is given by 
                                                        
2 Focusing on the realization shortfall ensures that the indicator takes into account the 
attainability constraint and the capped nature of attainable levels in light of the objective. 
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%&, ) = 1 +' #min	{0,  +  − ∗}


 
 
where min	{	} is the minimum function and the allocation satisfies the following 
resource constraint ∑  ≤ . The minimum function picks the lowest number 
in the set {0,  +  − ∗} which ensures that an excess amount of resources 
allocated to an individual adds no extra value to the indicator and thus the 
indicator takes into account both the attainability constraint and the capped 
nature of the objective, i.e. if  +  > ∗, all else equal, then min{0,  +  −
∗} = 0.  
 
The maximum value of the indicator is equal to 1 for all weighting schemes, i.e. 
%&, ) = 1 for all # satisfying ∑ # = 1.  To see this, note that the objective of 
aggregate gap closures is completely fulfilled for the population if the realization 
shortfalls of all individuals in the population who receive positive weight are 
satisfied, i.e. given an achievable allocation   and weighting scheme # =
#) , if  +  − ∗ ≥ 0 for all 
 with # > 0, then min{0,  +  − ∗} = 0 for 
all 
 with # > 0, and thus %&, ) = 1.  
 
The indicator satisfies the following monotonicity axiom which ensures that 
larger values of % indicate a greater degree of aggregate gap closure within the 
population (cf. Herlitz & Horan MS). 
 
Monotonicity Axiom: Given other things, a reduction in the closable gap of an 
individual strictly increases the indicator of aggregate gap closure provided the 
individual receives positive weight.3 
 
The satiable property of the gap closure objective allows us to characterize 
available resources in terms of sufficiency, abundance and scarcity (SAS) 
                                                        
3 More formally, suppose   = )  and + = +) are two achievable allocations for 
resources  such that +is Pareto superior to , i.e.  ≤ + for all 
, and , < ,+ for at least one 
individual -. It can be easily shown that if # is any arbitrary weighting scheme, then %&, ) ≤
%&, + ), and if #, > 0 and , < ,∗, then %&, ) < %&, + ). 
15 
 
according to the achievability of the following three types of intervention.4 Given 
an initial situation , resources  are said to be sufficient if there exists an 
achievable allocation such that the attainable levels of all individuals in the 
population who receive positive weight are achieved and none of these 
individuals receives an excess amount of the good, i.e. given  > 0, there exists 
an allocation  satisfying ∑  ≤  such that %&, ) = 1 and  = ∗ −  for 
all 
 with # > 0.  Secondly, resources  are said to be abundant if there exists an 
achievable allocation such that the attainable levels of all individuals in the 
population that receive positive weight are achieved and at least one of these 
individuals receives an excess amount of resources, i.e. given  > 0, there exists 
  satisfying ∑  ≤  such that %&, ) = 1,  ≥ ∗ −   for all 
 with # > 0 
and , > ,∗−, for at least one individual - with #, > 0.  Finally, resources R are 
said to be scarce if for all achievable allocations, there is at least one individual in 
the population that receives positive weight for whom their attainable level is 
not achieved, i.e. given  > 0, we have that %&, ) < 1 for all allocations  
satisfying ∑  ≤ . 
 
In case of scarcity, it becomes necessary to address which weighting scheme is 
an appropriate one so that different gap closures can be aggregated and 
alternative allocation alternatives compared. The first problem of aggregation 
occurs here. Several approaches to developing weighting schemes can be 
pursued. For example, weighting schemes could be individually specified, 
construed based on population characteristics, characteristics of the initial 
situation or outcome dependent considerations.  
 
In this paper we focus on weighting schemes derived from the view that 
individuals should be compensated for shortfalls that are not due to any decision 
of their own. We thus develop three different weighting schemes on the basis of 
the three types of shortfall we identified in the initial situation. An advantage of 
developing weights that depend on an initial situation is that the weights only 
                                                        
4 For a comprehensive review of the literature on SAS, see Daoud (Daoud 2011). 
16 
 
have to be elicited once and can then be applied to all social evaluations.5 Each 
type of shortfall will thus be reflected in a specific weighting scheme. 
 
First, consider a weighting scheme that gives extra weight to gap closures for 
individuals with greater realization shortfalls, i.e. the shortfall arising from the 
difference between an individual’s attainable and her current level, i.e. ∗ − ,. 
Many weighting schemes could be specified to capture such a prioritization. In 
this paper, we focus on weighting schemes in which the magnitude of an 
individual’s realization shortfall directly determines the priority weight. Suppose 
# = ./0	{12
∗342,5}
∑ ./0	{16∗346,5}6
 is the weight applicable to the benefits given to individual 
.6 
Incorporating this weighting scheme, the bad-realization indicator of aggregate 
gap closure, denoted %, is given by 
 
%, ) = 1 +' 
max9∗ − ,0:
∑ max9,∗ − ,,0:,
)min	{0,  +  − ∗}


 
 
Under this weighting scheme, benefits to individuals with larger realization 
shortfall receive relatively higher priority weight. The indicator thus favors 
allocations which distribute more resources to individuals with relatively larger 
realization shortfalls because benefits to such individuals receive higher weight 
under the prioritization and thus gap closure for these individuals contributes 
relatively greater value to the indicator. On the other hand, allocating resources 
to individuals with relatively smaller realization shortfalls gives a lower score to 
the indicator and thus contributes less to the overall objective of aggregate gap 
closure. This indicator thus captures the prioritization view that seeks to 
compensate individuals who are worse-off in terms of realization shortfalls. 
 
                                                        
5 A disadvantage of weighting schemes that depend on an initial situation is that weights do not 
depend on the outcome and thus the weights may in some circumstances become less relevant 
for social evaluations if the outcome differs substantially from the initial situation. For an 
illuminating discussion on the relative merits of outcome-based weighting schemes and weights 
that depend on an initial situation, see Bleichrodt et al. (Bleichrodt, Diecidue & Quiggin 2004) 
6 We assume that from here on in that there is at least one individual 
 in the population for 
whom  < ∗ < ∗∗.  This assumption ensures that all three of our weighting schemes are well 
defined, i.e. the denominator is non-zero and each of the weighting schemes sums to equal 1. 
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Second, consider now the prioritization view that seeks to compensate 
individuals who are worse off in terms of bad-offness shortfalls, i.e. the shortfall 
arising from differences between their current and ideal levels. Under this view, 
benefits to individuals with larger idealized gaps ought to be given higher 
priority weight. Suppose # = ./0	{;2
∗∗342,5}
∑ ./0	{;6∗∗346,5}6
 is the weight applicable to benefits 
given to individual 
. Incorporating this weighting scheme, the value of bad-
offness indicator of aggregate gap closures, denoted %<, is given by 
 
%<, ) = 1 +' 
max	{∗∗ − ,0}
∑ max	{,∗∗ − ,,0}, )min	{0,  +  − 
∗}


 
 
This indicator typically favors interventions that distribute relatively more 
resources to individuals with larger idealized gaps, i.e. large bad-offness 
shortfall, since benefits to such individuals receive higher priority weight. Thus, 
instead of giving relatively higher weight to individuals with larger closable gaps, 
the indicator gives extra weight to benefits to individuals who face the greatest 
distance between their current situation and the ideal target level.  Such 
individuals will only have a large closable gap if their attainable target level is 
reasonably close to their ideal target level, otherwise, their closable gap is 
smaller, but the weighting scheme still gives extra weight to their gap closure.  
  
Finally, consider the prioritization view that seeks to compensate individuals 
who are worse off in terms of bad-outlooks shortfalls, i.e. the difference between 
their attainable and ideal target levels, i.e. ∗∗ − ∗. Under this view, the closable 
gaps of individuals with greater bad-outlooks shortfalls ought to receive 
relatively higher priority weight.  Suppose # = ./0	{;2
∗∗312∗,5}
∑ ./0	{;6∗∗316∗5}6
 is the weight 
applicable to benefits given to individual 
.  Note for this weighting scheme, 
individuals with larger bad-outlooks shortfalls are considered worse off since 
they receive higher priority weight. Incorporating this weighting scheme, the 
value of bad-outlooks indicator of aggregate gap closure, denoted %=, is given by 
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%=, ) = 1 +' 
max	{∗∗ − ∗, 0}
∑ max	{,∗∗ − ,∗, 0}, )min	{0,  +  − 
∗}


 
 
Under this prioritization, the indicator tends to give higher value to 
interventions that favor gap closure for individuals who experience relatively 
greater bad-outlooks shortfall since benefits to such individuals receive higher 
priority weight. The closable gaps of such individuals may be large or small. On 
the one hand, the attainable level tends to be relatively further from the ideal 
target level, but on the other hand, their current level could also be quite low. 
However, the idea of compensating for bad-outlooks shortfalls requires that 
their closable gaps, whether small or large, receive extra weight in the 
prioritization. 
 
In situations characterized by a uniform ideal level, the following 
standardization technique can be applied to ensure that the values of the gap 
closure indicator are non-negative, regardless of the specific weighting scheme 
chosen.   
 
Suppose	 = , ∗, )  is a situation with a uniform target level  > 0 for all 
individuals. Given an achievable allocation   and weighting scheme # =
#) , the value of the standardized indicator of aggregate gap closures, 
denoted %>, is given by 
 
%>&, ) = 1 +' #min	{0,
 +  − ∗
 }


 
 
where the sum of the weights is equal to 1, i.e. ∑ # = 1. The values of the 
standardized indicator are non-negative with a maximum value of 1. Its 
minimum value depends on the weighting scheme and is given by 1 −
∑ # 12
∗342)
; ≥ 0 . The standardized indicator thus satisfies the following 
0 ≤ 1 − ∑ # 12
∗342)
; ≤ %>&, ) ≤ 1, for all weighting schemes # with ∑ # = 1, 
and achievable allocations  . We will make extensive use of this standardization 
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technique in the next section when we consider three examples, each of which 
has a uniform ideal level. 
 
III: Illustrative Examples of Prioritizations that Conflict 
 
We will now proceed and illustrate how the three weighting schemes can imply 
different prioritization decisions for one and the same choice situation, and 
thereby be inconsistent. For reasons of space, we don’t use real data for these 
illustrations.7 The examples are abstract, but we hope that it is easy enough for 
the reader to see the resemblance between them and actual social choice 
situations. 
 
Example 1: Consider a population of  = 3 individuals who share a common 
current level and uniform ideal target, but have heterogeneous attainable levels. 
Table 1 illustrates one such situation. In this example, whereas individual i has 
the lowest attainable level, and thus worst prospects, individual k has the highest 
attainable level, and thus best prospects. Suppose 25 units of resources are 
available to be distributed within the population, that every individual has the 
same capability of transforming resources into goods (cf. Moreno-Ternero & 
Roemer 2006), and consider the following two types of interventions.  
Intervention  allocates all of the extra resources to the person with the best 
prospects, i.e. to person @. By contrast, intervention A prioritizes persons with 
lower prospects, allocating resources to person 
 until their attainable level is 
achieved, and then distributing all of the remaining resources to the individual 
with the second lowest attainable level, i.e. person j.  
 
Table 1 reports values of the standardized indicator of aggregate gap closure for 
weighting schemes that seek to compensate individuals for realization shortfalls 
and bad-outlooks shortfalls. Notice that the bad-realization indicator ranks 
                                                        
7 The spreadsheets underlying the computations presented in these examples are available from 
the authors upon request.   
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intervention  as the best intervention, i.e. %>) > %>A), whereas the bad-
outlooks indicator gives a higher rank to intervention y, i.e. %>=A) > %>=).    
 
Table 1: Bad-realization and bad-outlooks prioritizations 
Population 
 
 
Ideal 
target 
∗∗ 
Attainable 
 target 
∗ 
Current 
 level 
 
Intervention 
 
 
Intervention 
 
A 
Bad-realization 
 weights 
# 
Bad-outlooks 
 weights 
#= 

 100 10 5 0 5 0.0370 0.6 
- 100 50 5 0 20 0.3333 0.3333 
@ 100 90 5 25 0 0.6296 0.0667 
Total 300 150 15 25 25 1 1 
Bad-realization indicator: %> 0.4704 0.3815 
Bad-outlooks indicator: %>= 0.78 0.86 
 
In this situation, the bad-realization prioritization views the person with the best 
prospects as the worst off since her closable gap is the largest. On the other hand, 
the person with the worst prospects is viewed as the best off since her closable 
gap is the smallest. Hence, the bad-realization prioritization gives the highest 
weight to benefits to person @ , and the lowest weight to benefits to 
 . 
Consequently, the bad-realization indicator favors interventions that prioritize 
distributing resources to @ rather than 
 or - and the indicator thus gives the 
higher value to intervention .   
 
In contrast, the bad-outlooks prioritization views the person with the worst 
prospects as the worst off, i.e. person 
, since her attainable level is lowest and 
furthest from the ideal target level. On the other hand, the person with the best 
prospects is viewed as the best off since her attainable level is highest and 
closest to the ideal level. Consequently, the bad-outlooks prioritization gives the 
highest weight to 
 and the lowest weight to @. In this situation, the bad-outlooks 
prioritization favors interventions that distribute more resources to 
 than @ and 
consequently it gives the higher value to intervention A.   
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Example 2: Consider now a population of  = 3 individuals characterized by a 
uniform ideal target, but heterogeneous attainable levels and heterogeneous 
current levels. Table 2 illustrates a situation in which individual @ has the best 
starting point but the worst prospects and 
 has the worst starting point but the 
best prospects. Suppose 20 extra units of resources are available, every 
individual has the same capability of transforming resources to goods and we 
consider two different types of interventions. Intervention  distributes all of the 
extra resources to the person with the worst prospects, i.e. person @, whereas 
intervention A distributes all of the extra resources to the person with the worst 
starting point, i.e. person 
. 
 
Table 2 reports, for each of these interventions, values of the standardized 
indicator of gap closure for weighting schemes based on bad-offness and bad-
outlooks shortfalls. Notice that whereas the bad-offness indicator gives higher 
rank to intervention A, i.e. %><A) > %><), the bad-outlooks indicator gives higher 
ranking to intervention , i.e. %>=) > %>=A). 
 
Table 2: Bad-offness and bad-outlooks prioritizations 
Population 
 
N 
Ideal 
target 
∗∗ 
Attainable 
 target 
∗ 
Current 
 level 
 
Intervention 
 
 
Intervention 
 
A 
Bad-offness 
 weights 
#< 
Bad-outlooks 
 weights 
#= 

 100 70 0 0 20 0.3704 0.2857 
- 100 65 10 0 0 0.3333 0.3333 
@ 100 60 20 20 0 0.2963 0.3810 
Total 300 195 30 20 20 1 1 
Bad-offness indicator: %>< 0.4981 0.5130 
Bad-outlooks indicator: %>= 0.5405 0.5214 
 
From a bad-offness perspective, the person with the worst starting point is the 
worst off since her current level	is furthest from the uniform ideal level. Hence, 
benefits to person 
 receive the highest weight, whereas benefits to the person 
with the best starting point, i.e. person @, receive the lowest weight under this 
prioritization. The bad-offness prioritization favors intervention A since this 
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intervention distributes all of the extra resources to the person with the largest 
idealized gap in the initial situation.   
 
On the other hand, the bad-outlooks perspective views the person with the worst 
prospects as the worst off since her attainable level is furthest from the uniform 
ideal. Consequently in this situation, the bad-outlooks prioritization gives the 
highest weight to benefits to the person with the best starting point and worst 
prospects and the lowest weight to benefits to the person with the best 
prospects. The bad-outlooks prioritization thus favors intervention A since this 
intervention gives all of the extra resource to the person with the largest bad-
outlooks shortfall, i.e. person @. 
 
Example 3: Consider finally a population of  = 3 individuals with a uniform 
ideal target, but heterogeneous attainable levels and heterogeneous current 
levels. Table 3 illustrates a situation in which individual k has the best starting 
point and the best prospects, and individual i has the worst starting point and 
worst prospects. Suppose 20 units of additional resources are available, uniform 
capability to transform resources to goods and consider the following two types 
of interventions. Intervention  distributes all of the extra resources to the 
person with the best starting point and best prospects, whereas intervention A 
allocates all of the additional resources to the person with the worst starting 
point and worst prospects. 
 
Table 3 reports values of the standardized indicator for weighting schemes that 
aim to compensate individuals for realization shortfalls and bad-offness 
shortfalls. In particular, although the bad-realization indicator gives a higher 
rank to intervention , i.e. %>) > %>A), the bad-offness indicator gives the 
higher rank to intervention A, i.e.	%><A) > %><).  
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Table 3: Bad-realization and bad-offness prioritizations 
Population 
 
N 
Ideal 
target 
∗∗ 
Attainable 
 target 
∗ 
Current 
 level 
 
Intervention 
 
 
Intervention 
 
A 
Bad-realization 
 weights 
# 
Bad-
offness 
 weights 
#< 

 100 40 20 0 20 0.1818 0.3810 
- 100 70 30 0 0 0.3636 0.3333 
@ 100 90 40 20 0 0.4545 0.2857 
Total 300 200 90 20 20 1 1 
Bad-realization indicator: %> 0.6818 0.6273 
Bad-offness indicator: %>< 0.7048 0.7238 
 
From the bad-realization perspective, the person with the worst starting point 
and worst prospects has the smallest closable gap and consequently benefits to 
her receive the lowest weight under this prioritization. On the other hand, the 
person with the best starting point and best prospects has the largest closable 
gap and benefits to her thus receive the highest weight under the bad-realization 
perspective. Consequently in this example, the bad-realization indicator favors 
the intervention that distribute relatively more resources to the person with the 
best starting point and best prospects, i.e. intervention A.   
 
From the bad-offness perspective, the person with the worst starting point and 
worst prospects has the largest idealized gap and consequently benefits to her 
receive the highest weight under this prioritization. On the other hand, the 
individual with the best starting point and best prospects has the lowest 
idealized gap and benefits to her thus receive the lowest weight.  As a result, in 
this example, the bad-offness indicator favors intervention A  since this 
intervention distributes more resources to the individual whose starting point is 
furthest from the uniform ideal level. 
 
IV: Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have underlined the importance of the distinction between 
attainable levels and ideal levels for assessments of distributive fairness. Once 
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this distinction is recognized, it is revealed that the notion of prioritizing the 
worse off has three distinct interpretations, all of which are to some extent 
reasonable. We provided examples of these interpretations in terms of weighting 
schemes for gap closures, and illustrated that they under certain circumstances 
support different and incompatible prioritization decisions. 
 
Nothing prevents us, of course, from recognizing the validity of a plurality of 
grounds for priority weights. However, since the different weighting schemes 
occasionally conflict, a proponent of this sort of pluralism needs to explain how 
we should deal with such conflicts. This can be done in different ways. Either, 
one can develop a way of aggregating the weighting schemes, or one can 
introduce lexical orders of weighting schemes so that, for example, priority 
weights that are based on the difference between attainable levels and ideal 
levels only are relevant when other priority weights fail to establish a unique 
alternative that is better than all other alternatives. Whichever approach one 
takes to this issue, it requires an explanation and a defense, and such are not 
possible to discern in the current literature on substantial principles of 
distributive fairness.  
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